Exclusive focus on the nuclear issue has caused a strategic myopia in Washington that prevents the development of a viable long-term strategy for Iran and misses broader opportunities to induce Iranian cooperation.

Cris suggests that if the U.S. can get beyond simple sticks and carrots and really address the role Iran wants in the world–and, as I read it, do so in such a way as to constructively help shape that role–then the regime could be inclined to step up to the table rather than play the only power card it’s got, that of nuclear threat.

If the administration were to introduce a “grand bargain” and treat such issues as “regional security, trade and investment, legal claims, cultural exchange, and so forth,” then the Iranian people might be enticed toward a greater role in the global community.

Full integration of Iran into the international community, including resumption of diplomatic relations with the US, would be a powerful incentive if properly packaged. If the Iranian people can more clearly see the benefits offered by negotiations, Iran’s leaders will be more likely to compromise to get talks going again.

A package of incentives might include technology sharing on peaceful nuclear fuel development, the lifting of the US trade embargo, developing Iran’s refining capacity, targeted economic assistance, and expedited settlement of Iran’s legal claims.

I don’t know enough about Iran to know whether Cris is right on the policy approach. But it seems he’s definitely right that, should the Obama administration want to introduce a game changer to the tired rhetorical stalemate, then the U.S. has to be ready to talk about more than the thorny nuclear issue before we can resolve the thorny nuclear issue.

The only thing I’d add is, at the end of the day, what does the U.S. have to lose by fully engaging Iran as a means of ending the nuclear standoff? Worst-case scenario, the administration can say, “Well, we tried everything we’ve got, and we got nowhere.” It’s really no skin off our nose. The U.S. is still a very big, very wealthy country, and Iran is still very small and very poor. The only party that ought to be trying to save face is the Iranian regime. If the U.S. can help them do that, don’t we get what we want, too?

Afghanistan

The Guardian’s Jason Burke considers today’s attack in Kabul:

Fourth, the Taliban are not working with the same worldview as the west. The elections are not, to them, a potential turning point nor a litmus test of the success of the Afghanistan project. Nor is something as short-term as a single poll of great significance given the length of time they have allowed for their strategy to succeed. That strategy is two-fold: establish a parallel administration in enough of Afghanistan for the central administration to be fatally weakened and to progressively destroy all support for the presence of western troops in Afghanistan in the USA and Europe.

This is one of the problems with setting benchmarks, I think. A single election is a blip on the radar. Karzai’s reelection (presumably) has little immediate impact on the Taliban’s insurgent efforts. It’s not as if a democratic (presumably) exercise will prove to the Taliban that significant progress is taking place in the country, unless that democratic exercise is also accompanied by the type of American/European follow through that improves lives for people in the region. To this end, occupying forces have to win hearts and minds, and this is a harder thing to measure.

Increasing U.S. forces in Afghanistan is going to be a good thing if Afghans see that the U.S. actually wants to and truly can help the people. But the Taliban isn’t going away any time soon (see Gelb, March 2009), and the thorniest issues that the U.S. will have to address reside across the border in Pakistan. In addition, increasing U.S. forces in Afghanistan is also bound to lead to increased incidents between U.S. forces and Afghan civilians. It’s almost too obvious to state out loud, but collateral damage weakens U.S. efforts to win hearts and minds.

It’ll be a tough sell to convince Afghans broadly that the United States is in their country to help them. And as Burke points out, the Taliban are also stepping up efforts to win hearts and minds while still waging a guerrilla war. It’s knotty, knotty, knotty, and we’re not all looking at it the same way. Elections won’t indicate whether the U.S. is winning in Afghanistan. The Taliban know this, and the Afghan people likely do also. So the question remains, do we?