Colorado Progressive

Disclosure: Cris DeFrancia is my wife’s cousin. He’s also a great writer and a very smart guy. Last week he published an op-ed in the Christian Science Monitor urging the Obama administration to engage Iran in substantive talks focused on much more than the nuclear issue.

Exclusive focus on the nuclear issue has caused a strategic myopia in Washington that prevents the development of a viable long-term strategy for Iran and misses broader opportunities to induce Iranian cooperation.

Cris suggests that if the U.S. can get beyond simple sticks and carrots and really address the role Iran wants in the world–and, as I read it, do so in such a way as to constructively help shape that role–then the regime could be inclined to step up to the table rather than play the only power card it’s got, that of nuclear threat.

If the administration were to introduce a “grand bargain” and treat such issues as “regional security, trade and investment, legal claims, cultural exchange, and so forth,” then the Iranian people might be enticed toward a greater role in the global community.

Full integration of Iran into the international community, including resumption of diplomatic relations with the US, would be a powerful incentive if properly packaged. If the Iranian people can more clearly see the benefits offered by negotiations, Iran’s leaders will be more likely to compromise to get talks going again.

A package of incentives might include technology sharing on peaceful nuclear fuel development, the lifting of the US trade embargo, developing Iran’s refining capacity, targeted economic assistance, and expedited settlement of Iran’s legal claims.

I don’t know enough about Iran to know whether Cris is right on the policy approach. But it seems he’s definitely right that, should the Obama administration want to introduce a game changer to the tired rhetorical stalemate, then the U.S. has to be ready to talk about more than the thorny nuclear issue before we can resolve the thorny nuclear issue.

The only thing I’d add is, at the end of the day, what does the U.S. have to lose by fully engaging Iran as a means of ending the nuclear standoff? Worst-case scenario, the administration can say, “Well, we tried everything we’ve got, and we got nowhere.” It’s really no skin off our nose. The U.S. is still a very big, very wealthy country, and Iran is still very small and very poor. The only party that ought to be trying to save face is the Iranian regime. If the U.S. can help them do that, don’t we get what we want, too?